Inhalt: Die Arbeit versucht, so gerafft wie nur möglich zu zeigen, daß seit dem Zeitalter der Renaissance, dann der Reformation, Ideen und Ideensysteme die Geschichte aufgrund der geänderten technischen und materiellen Bedingungen, die das Geistesleben nunmehr betrafen, zunehmend beeinflußten. Entsprechend der Mobilisierung der Intelligenz, wie sie etwa die Erfindung der Druckkunst "auslöste", fanden Entwicklungen aller Art, die hier oder dort, in diesem oder jenem Land, einsetzten, Aufnahme und Antwort bald auch in anderen Ländern. Anstöße zum Wandel, zur Veränderung, wurden damit auch dort registriert, wo sie ursprünglich gar nicht gegeben waren. Nationa lismus oder das Unternehmen, die Identität des Landes, dem man zugehört, festzustellen und zu befördern, ist in diesem Zusammenhang einer der wichtigsten, alle Aufmerksamkeit verdienenden Beispielsfälle.
Nationalism is the great faith of the modern world, surpassing by far the international ap peals of science or of Marxism, two other secular faiths which in practice are often divided along national lines. The nationalist faith has become world/wide since the sixteenth century, gradually fusing nearly everywhere with the idea of government in the name of the people, what ever form government has actually taken. In deed, today only a very few military or monar chical regimes not only rule autocratically but actually discard populist justifications of that rule. Most governments prefer to make their peace with the idea of popular sovereignty, whatever their governmental practices may be.
I want to show that nationalism has been made possible by intellectual mobilization the growth of a reading public and of an educated secular elite dependent on learned occupations. Recognition of this mobilization as a cause of social change need not detract from the familiar processes associated with economic development, such as urbanization and the commercialization of land, labor, and capital. But there are move ments since 1500, such as the Reformation, agitation for ethnic and religious autonomy, for freedom and equality, which do not have a sim ple basis in the division of labor or class inter est. Nationalism in particular is noteworthy for its protean reaction to the international position of one's country, whether it is a superpower or a "new state" searching for identity. Ideas trav el fast. In states that become aware of their backwardness in comparison with a more ad vanced country, the search for ways to over come backwardness and acquire a respected place among nations often precedes every other kind of change. In this discussion of nationalism I will emphasize intellectual mobilization as a precondition of nationalism, the importance for nationalism of "demonstration effects" from ad vanced to follower societies, and the consequent division among nationalists between modernizers and nativists in one country after another.
I. Intellectual mobilization
Since the sixteenth century, the world has been in permanent revolution, if by that phrase we understand the thoroughgoing, if often unwit ting, transformation of social conditions due to technical and economic change, wars, political intervention, and last but not least outright rev olution. In his Novum Organum (1620), FRAN CIS BACON noted that printing, gunpowder, and the magnet had "changed the whole face and state of things throughout the world" (1939: 85) . Guns mounted on ships were the technical means by which explorers and conquerors in itiated the age of European expansion overseas (CIPOLLA, 1965: passim) . The life-times of the great explorers (COLUMBUS, 1445 (COLUMBUS, -1506 DA GAMA, 1469 ? -1524 MAGELLAN, 1480 MAGELLAN, -1521 overlapped with those of LUTHER (1483-1546) and COPERNICUS (1473 COPERNICUS ( -1543 so that there is a broad concurrence between exploration, overseas expansion, and the trans formation of the prevailing religious and scien tific worldviews. All of this had been preceded by the invention of printing, the first GUTEN BERG Bible appearing sometime before 1456. The number of educated people increased, as did the number of those whose livelihood depended upon teaching, writing, or some other intellectu al vocation. The new facility of printing ex plains why overseas exploration, the Reforma tion, and the early development of science re sulted in a burgeoning literature of travelogues, religious pamphlets, and scientific and political tracts1. I call this whole process of a more rapid reproduction and diffusion of ideas and the re lated increase in the number of writers and read ers "intellectual mobilization". facilitated by the invention of printing, old learned occupations turned secular, new profes sions based on learning developed, governments became bureaucratic, and secular education rose to social esteem and functional importance. (CARR-SAUNDERS/WILSON, 1964: passim) . Furthermore, the Reformation gave impetus to literacy among the middle and lower strata of the population and, later, writing became an in dependent, secular profession (WILLIAMS, 1961: passim) . In the course of these transformations, many people became consumers of secular cul ture, whereas formerly they had been confined to religious observances and popular amuse ments. This emergence of a culture-consuming public is the background for the intellectual leadership of an active minority composed of lawyers, teachers, ministers, writers, and many others There is a correlation between economic back wardness and intellectual mobilization, which was described by the RIEHL had genuine insight into the uneven pace of the intellectual, economic, and social develop ment of a country, and that insight applies quite generally to follower societies of the nineteenth and twentieth century. But RIEHL's conservatism put him out of sympathy with the intellectuals he described, and he failed to see that their mobilization was a general attri bute of European countries developing a na tional identity.
In late sixteenth-century England, three groups developed which eventually coalesced in oppo sition to the rule of CHARLES I. The first group consisted of Puritan divines, led by men who had been persecuted under the reign of MARY TUDOR. After ELIZABETH came to the throne (in 1558), these men wanted to purify the Anglican church of its Catholic le gacies in doctrine and ritual, but they wanted to do so from within the church through re form of church service, the presbyterian prin ciple of organization, and widespread lecturing (see WALZER, 1970: passim) . The second group consisted of common lawyers, members of a conservative profession, many of whom had a guild-like interest in the common-law courts as against the prerogative courts of the king (see PREST, 1972: passim) . The third group consisted of prominent landed gentry in parliament, men of great standing in the realm who sponsored the Puritan clergy through their control of church benefices and employed common lawyers in their many lawsuits. These aristocratic representatives of "the country" were often legally trained and many were themselves Puritans (cf. ZAGORIN, 1971) . The ties of inter est which linked these three groups have been the subject of much controversy. But there is less dispute that these men of faith, vested interest, and high social standing were originally prompt ed by the English Reformation to define the position and aspirations of their country in con scious opposition to the Spanish world-empire and its alliance with the Papal attack on the English heresy (WIENER, 1971) .
One can put the development of eighteenth-cen tury France in analogous terms. LOUIS XIV died in 1715, leaving a country that was cultur ally and politically preeminent in the world, but exhausted from the decades of war leading to that position (see GOUBERT, 1970) . In the wake of LOUIS XIV's reign, opposition to the ancien regime and ultimately to the monarchy also showed a strong convergence of theoretical principles, vested interests, and high social stand ing. The philosophes formulated their doctrine of natural rights in opposition to church and nobility under the inspiration of NEWTON and LOCKE. The famous Encyclopedic, beginning its publication in 1751, linked a burgeoning natural science which found universal acclaim with the principles of reason and natural law applied to man and society. Soon, these beliefs were taken up by others whose social position gave great weight to their opinions. One group consisted of the parlementaires, the noblesse de robe serving on the sovereign courts of France primarily in a judicial capacity. But these par lementaires, especially those of Paris, had the right and duty to register governmental edicts without which no royal decree was legally valid; and when they refused to do so, as they often did in the eighteenth century, they used the language of the philosophes to justify their ac tions. Another group consisted of the high French nobility, congregating not only at the Versailles court, but in the salons and masonic lodges of Paris where they mingled freely with the luminaries of French culture. Note that the language of the philosophes, the parlemen taires and the nobility was suffused with ideas derived from English parliamentary institutions and from the struggle for independence of the American colonies. Thus, opinions of the educat ed elite (which led up to the French Revolution) were mobilized by invidious comparisons bet ween the freedoms achieved or fought for in England and America and the vested interests and abrogation of rights characteristic of the French ancien regime2. The French revolution and the populist revolu tions which followed must be distinguished from the English revolutions of 1640 and 1688. The mainstream of English revolutionary thought was limited by the religious and legal contexts in which the old justifications of authority had been questioned. English theory and practice remained compatible with the restoration of oligarchic rule, though on the new basis of the "king-in-parliament". By contrast, French revolutionary thought went beyond such limi tations because it made the people and the nation the basis of all authority. Note also that in both cases the movement towards revolution was spearheaded by men of education and standing in the established society of their day. As one observes old societies that have lain on the periphery of Europe's outward thrust over the centuries, or as one moves east in Europe itself during the nineteenth century, one finds countries in which neither an educated elite, nor representative institutions, nor an economically and politically active bourgeoisie and aristocracy are indigenous developments, or at any rate not vigorous one. Such countries are arenas of intel lectual mobilization in which officials, teachers, literary people, and other members of RIEHL's "intellectual proletariat" tend to coalesce into a class of their own. That class consists of ide ological groups which are sensitive to develop ments beyond their country's frontiers and anx ious to find a more viable mode of social organ ization for their native land.
II. Demonstration effects
A revolution occurs when a social order is dras tically transformed and reconstituted. Though revolutions are conventionally identified with lower-class movements, a "revolution from above" can be equally far-reaching. Indeed, re storations can prove as revolutionary as re volutions. The Meiji restoration of 1868 is a good example, for the Meiji government re structured the whole political and social order to Tokugawa Japan. Should this restructuring be called a revolution even though it was un dertaken in the interest of national survival against Western incursions and quickly entailed the imposition of new restraints? I think it should, because both nationalism and the reas sertion of authority are found in many (pos sibly all) modern revolutions.
Modern history has been characterized by con secutive revolutions or restorations, with each of these transformations influencing the next.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Eng land began these great upheavals with the Henrician Reformation, the civil war and revolu tion of 1640-1660, and the "Glorious Revolu tion" of 1688. These were followed by the in dustrial and the French revolutions of the eighteenth century, the Prussian reforms (1 SOT-ISM) and the unification of Germany under BISMARCK (1870-1871), the Meiji restoration of Japan in 1868, and the transformation of Russia from the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 to the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and die Stalinist revolution of 1928. Each of these revolutions or restorations was a collective re sponse to both internal conditions end external stimuli. Each had repercussions beyond the frontiers of the country in which it occurred. After each transformation, the world changed in HERACLITUS' sense that you cannot step into the same river twice. Once the English king had been overthrown and parliament declared su preme, other monarchies became insecure and the idea of parliamentary government was launched. Once industrialization was initiated, other economies became backward. Once the idea of equality had been proclaimed before a world-wide audience, inequality became a bur den too heavy to bear3.
Inequality had been an accepted condition of ble. In the household, masters ruled over their servants as the king ruled over his subjects. In TOCQUEVILLE's view, the "whole course of society" since the eleventh century had been marked by an increasing equality of condition. Wars dispersed noble estates. The clergy acquired power and opened its ranks to all classes. Commoners obtained high positions at court, enriched themselves through commerce, and acquired title by purchase. Every improvement in trade and manufacture, every acquisition of property, and every discovery in the arts creat ed "new elements of equality", as did the great historical events of this long period. TOCQUEVILLE was right in emphasizing the spread of equalitarian ideas, but he failed to ex amine the process by which such ideas spread from country to country. Since the fifteenth century, the transformation of societies has been accelerated by the revolution in communications and by intellectual mobilization. Advances in one part of the world have provid ed impulses for change in others. For example, sixteenth-century England was still comparative ly slow in the commercialization of labor and capital, but the country witnessed a flourishing trade, a rapid commercialization of land, and a high degree of intellectual mobilization. The awakening of both national awareness and of self-confidence mixed with apprehension was due in good part to English perceptions of French, Spanish, and Catholic intentions. It was due also to English self-perceptions as a small island on the margins of a Continent. Spain dominated the western Mediterranean and encir cled the globe, France dominated Europe, and the Pope controlled an international church with hierarchical connections in nearly all countries. The Spanish empire, France, and the Catholic church were the "reference societies" to which the intellectual leaders and the educated public of England responded emotionally and political-ly. The results of those responses may be termed "demonstration effects"4 * .
Two centuries later, observes of the industrial revolution were impressed -and rightly so -by the role the division of labor played in the eco nomic development of all Western European societies. Since the modern industrial revolution had begun in England, other countries followed the English model when they began to develop their own industry. But they wished to follow the latest English development to which they could gain access, not the English practices of the 1760's with which English industrialization began. Countries were, therefore, less and less able or willing to repeat each other's develop ment (see GERSCHENKRON, 1965: passim) .
Nor were they likely to become the same kind of societies as a result of successful industrializa tion. Continued political and cultural differentia tion is the more likely outcome. The "demon stration effect" itself prevents societies from re peating each other's development, thus hinder ing industrial societies from converging cultural ly and institutionally.
HENRI PIRENNE (in Medieval Cities) has illus trated how the demonstration effect worked prior to the modern revolution in communica tions. In the eleventh century, the merchants and craft guilds of a few cities used force to win recognition of their independent jurisdiction from feudal overlords. A good many other rulers took the hint and negotiated a settlement with their own towns before armed conflict occurred (PIRENNE, 1956: 121 ff.) . In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the English and French revolutions provided demonstration effects of far greater impact due to the intellectual mobili zation after 1500. These two societies, them selves having responded to reference societies, be came the reference-point to which follower-so cieties responded by taking them either as mo dels or as an indication of what to avoid in charting their own development. As a reaction to English and French antecedents, German rulers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in an effort to maintain their inherited authori ty, proposed to do for "their" people -by a revolution from above -what the French peo ple had done at high cost by and for themselves (see EPSTEIN, 1966: 391 f.) . In the twentieth century, the Russian revolution became -at least for awhile -the reference society for China after 1949. Russia's overthrow of an old regime in an economically backward society and its forced collectivization and industrializa tion were achieved at enormous cost. The Chi nese under the leadership of MAO TSE-TUNG reacted to this model by accepting a slower rate of economic growth and with a positive emphasis on the peasantry, on re-education campaigns, and on the importance of subjective commit ment as a major cause of change. By linking these policies with the Chinese tradition, they have created a new revolutionary model. Today, Communist China has demonstration effects on other countries, which have been added to the demonstration effects of earlier revolutions and restorations.
I believe an archetypical experience underlies the obvious diversity of these examples. In com parison with some advanced country (or coun tries), the educated minority or intelligentsia sees its own country as backward. This is a troubled perception, for it identifies strength if not goodness with alien forces and sees weak ness if not evil in the land of one's birth. In this setting, ideas are used to locate and mobilize forces which will be capable of effecting change and thus redressing this psychologically unfavor able accounting. A typical strategy of perception and argument ensues. As viewed by the outsider, the strength of the advanced country is formid able, but it is also sapped by false values, cor ruption, and spiritual decay and therefore should not or cannot endure. At the same time, the weakness of one's native land is pervasive, but the hidden spiritual values of the people are an untapped source of strength which will prevail in the end. Thus, the dominance of the ad vanced country carries within it the seeds of its own destruction, while the backward people and the underdeveloped country possess capacities that are signs of a bright future. Behind this strategy lies the simple belief that ultimately the advanced country must be weak because its people are evil, while the backward country must be strong because its people are good.
Such secular prophecy has been an important factor in nationalist efforts to achieve the social and economic development of backward coun tries by routes other than those followed in the pioneering country. This archetype of "intel lectual mobilization" under conditions of rela tive backwardness provides only a model. When sensitive and articulate men and women suffer from the weakness and deprivation that is all around them, they will leave no avenue untried to better the fortunes of their country and its people. When practical measures to do so are unavailable, free play is given to ideas. The re sult is a kaleidoscope of national aspirations linked to a world-history of uneven development and world-wide inequalities.
ALEXANDER HERZEN once wrote that "hu man development is a form of chronological un fairness, since late-comers are able to profit by the labours of their predecessors without paying the same price"5. He neglected to mention the unprecedented problems which new states face and the price they must pay for "human devel opment". Indeed, the problems facing each mod ernizing country are largely unique. Even the countries which had been building their political institutions for centuries still have to cope with the repercussions of their process of moderniza tion. Today new states looking for analogies or precedents in other countries have more models to choose from than ever before, but their his tories and the earlier development of other countries have not prepared them for the tasks of nation-building.
HI. Modernizers and nativists
These tasks have been formidable throughout but perhaps they are even more so in the setting of the twentieth century. "Demonstration ef fects" make it impossible to repeat earlier devel opments, the effort of learning from the devel opments of other countries is beset by difficulty and -pace HERZEN -the price may be high, tvery idea taken from elsewhere can be both an asset to the development of a country and a reminder of its comparative backwardness -that is, both a challenge to be emulated and, what ever its utility, a threat to national identity. What appears desirable from the standpoint of progress often appears dangerous to national in dependence. The revolution in communications since the fifteenth century has been accompa nied by ever new confrontations with this cruel dilemma, and the rise of nationalism has been the response nearly everywhere.
The contemporary world has made us familiar with the tension between progress and national identity. Each country must cope socially and politically with the disruptive impact of ideas and industrial practices taken from abroad. Its ability or inability to do so is conditioned to a considerable extent by its own history. The old societies which have recently become new states look back upon centuries of historical experience involving a mixture of languages, economic systems, and religious beliefs6. This is the base from which they must master the im pact of the "advanced world". Only by under standing the peculiarities of each affected civili zation can we begin to assess how different countries will cope (or fail to cope) with the ideas and institutions of the industrially and politically influential countries.
The advanced countries of today have had their own periods of underdevelopment and of re sponding to the "advanced world" of their day. They have grappled for centuries with internal divisions and the problems of political integra tion and still struggle (as all countries must) with the unresolved legacies of their several his tories. For example, "England" does not in clude Scotland and Wales and is a misleading name for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Scottish nationalism, Welsh language and culture, and the continuing struggles in Northern Ireland certainly reinforce that point (cf. HECHTER, 1977: passim) . Eth nic, linguistic, and religious divisions pose everchanging problems of political accommodation, and societies are unified only in the sense that they have learned to handle such diversities.
Terms like "state" or "nation" play down or ignore these persistent divisions, but political unity is never complete, and serious challenges to it recur to this day even in the old states.
In the new states, the predominance of civil ties over the affinities of language, religion, and ethnicity is a much more recent and precarious development. Fifty-one countries founded the United Nations in 1945; from 1946 to 1976 ninety-one additional countries have become sov ereign. Most new states have had to establish their governments on a new basis and define "the people" as the ultimate source of authority.
In the new states, nationalist appeals to legiti macy are heard frequently -even in the absence of war (the by-product of which was the forma tion of political community in the old states).
However, nationalism, while a nearly universal phenomenon in modern history, is not in fact a force that easily unifies countries. Indeed, the old states underwent long periods of intellectual polarization when they had to come to terms with challenges from abroad. The typical re sponse -which is evident today in the new states -is a polarization of modernizers and nativists. One example of this phenomenon is the debate in eighteenth-and nineteenth-cen tury Japan between those who advocated nation al learning (kokugaku) and desired to derive all guidance from Japanese tradition, and those who advocated Dutch learning (rangaku) and desired to complement their native heritage with West ern knowledge (see EARL, 1964: passim) . An other example is found in Russia, the gradual transformation of whose "backwardness" is in distinguishable from its responses to the West. The conflict between modernizers and tradition alist is evident in the debates of the Nikonian reformers and the Old Believers over the intro duction of "foreign" ideas into the Orthodox church in the seventeenth century and in the debates of the Westernizers and Slavophils in the nineteenth century.
Modernizers and nativists share the desire to pre serve and enhance their native land -and even the hostility to the "advanced country". A Westernizer like HERZEN commented on his "elec tive affinity" with the Slavophils: "Like Janus, or the two-headed eagle, we looked in opposite directions, but one heart beats in our breasts"7.
Quoted in ADAM YARMOLINSKY (1962: 73).
All the same, such groups are deeply divided over the path their country should follow.
In the examples of Englishmen responding to the Spanish and Catholic danger in the sixteenthcentury, or of the Chinese to "Mr. Science" and "Mr. Democracy" of the West in the early twen tieth century, a pattern emerges. Perception of advances abroad are reminders of backwardness or dangers and weaknesses at home. Intellectuals attempt to cope with the ensuing dilemma: Whether to adopt the advanced model and in vite its attending corruptions, or fall back upon native traditions and risk their inappropriateness to the world of power and progress. This dilem ma engenders heated debates and ever-uneasy compromises which have their common denom inator in a shared concern for the native coun try. Such intensive debates prompted by com mon concerns are the foundation of nationalism. The result need not be divisive: A traditionalist like GANDHI and a modernizer like NEHRU could work together in their opposition to Bri tish rule. But the debates between "nativists" and "modernizers" remain unresolved more of ten than not, both during the struggle against an old regime and after it has been overthrown and a new regime established.
Before as well as after the revolution the root causes of nationalism remain. Men want their country recognized and respected in the world, and to this end they cultivate or revive native traditions. The reconstruction of history is an act of resacralizing authority in the name of the people. It is an appeal to civic loyalty and national brotherhood in lieu of more divisive communal attachments, because birth in a com mon homeland makes all people members of one nation sharing equally in its past glories. But the desire to be recognized and respected in the world also calls for the development of a modern economy and government which focuses attention upon the advanced society (or socie ties) of one's choice. This reference to foreign models has become inescapable since the great intellectual mobilization of the sixteenth cen tury.
***
My account has attempted to show that nation alism has become a universal condition in our world because the sense of backwardness in one's own country has led to ever new encoun ters with the "advanced model" or development of another country. Within the context of mod ern communications and uneven development, this process of historical models and their de monstration effects continues to the present, and I cannot see an end to its further ramifica tions.
Several countries have been in the world-his torical position of providing demonstration ef fects. In the twentieth century, old models have been replaced once more. After Spain and Por tugal, after England and France, it is now the turn of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and China. Any heir of the Western tradition will watch new states with humility and respect for the personal courage of people who must try to blend restored traditions with the demands of modern development under the conditions of the twentieth century.
